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nequality is a major challenge for poverty reduction and a crucial obstacle
for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. There are both intrinsic
and instrumental reasons why inequality matters, such as social justice and morality,
putting the poor first, growth and efficiency, political legitimacy, and public policy
goals (see page 13).
More rapid income poverty reduction requires both a more rapid pace of growth and
a more pro-poor pattern, which implies a reduction of the inequalities that limit the
prospects for poor people to share in the opportunities created by economic growth.
The poverty impact of growth has been shown to be more than 10 times higher in
those countries that combined growth with falling rather than rising inequality.
However, all forms of inequality may not necessarily be harmful. While inequalities
in opportunities are clearly both inefficient and unfair, it can be argued (see pages 20
and 23) that income differences reflecting varying degrees of effort—and that provide
incentives—in education, work and risk-taking entrepreneurship, are helpful for the
living-standards of the poor over time. On the other hand, such “good” inequalities
arising in one generation may lead to “bad” inequalities for the next, which will still
be unacceptable for all the above-mentioned reasons.
This issue of Poverty in Focus highlights inequality as one of IPC’s priority areas of
research. It provides some of the most important recent research results on the extent
of inequality in the distribution of wealth and incomes at both the global and national
levels, on analytical aspects of causes and patterns, and on policy conclusions and
recommendations.
UNU-WIDER first presents a summary of a new study of the global distribution of
household wealth, which is seen to be even more unequal than that of incomes.
Branko Milanovic analyses the concepts of global income inequality and its component
factors, including the role of globalisation, with a proposal for global redistribution.
José Gabriel Palma reveals and  analyses a fact that has been missing in the inequality
discourse: while income distributions vary a lot at the top and bottom across countries,
they are remarkably similar for the middle classes.
Michael Kremer shows why globalisation tends to increase inequalities in poor countries,
contrary to the standard economic textbook model. Outsourcing is one major reason.
Kevin Watkins discusses the five main reasons why inequality is bad for growth,
democracy, social justice and cohesion, and for the MDG prospects. Hence UNDP
stresses the need for public policies to focus more on reducing inequalities.
Elizabeth A. Stanton outlines how the UNDP Human Development Index could, and
should, be adjusted to make it more sensitive to multidimensional inequalities.
Frances Stewart stresses the need to measure and monitor horizontal inequalities
among groups in order to promote efficiency, growth, peace and poverty reduction.
Marcelo Medeiros puts the inequality issue on its head by focusing on the rich,
who should provide the resources for the necessary redistribution of income.
Francisco Ferreira underlines the policy importance of distinguishing analytically
between “good” and “bad” inequalities, using cholesterol as a metaphor.
Shubham Chaudhuri and Martin Ravallion apply this distinction to the recent patterns of
unequal growth in China and India that may threaten future growth and stability.
Björn Gustafsson, Li Shi and Terry Sicular summarise a forthcoming book on inequality
and public policy in China, concluding that changes are necessary in the balance
between the processes that affect inequality.
Joana Costa, Marcelo Medeiros and Rafael Guerreiro Osório consider inequality of people’s
time use, including unpaid work, across social classes and the gender divide.
This collection of articles is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the
importance of reducing inequalities in its various forms, and thus to policies and
programmes that will more effectively reduce poverty and social injustice.Poverty In Focus   June 2007    3
The Global Distribution
of Household Wealth
by  James Davies1, Susanna Sandström2,
Anthony Shorrocks2 and Edward Wolff 3
While the richest 10 percent of adults
in the world own 85 percent of global
household wealth, the bottom half
collectively owns barely 1 percent. Even
more strikingly, the average person in the
top 10 percent owns nearly 3,000 times the
wealth of the average person in the bottom
10 percent. These are some of the results
that emerge from a new UNU-WIDER study
of the distribution of household wealth.
We estimate the level and distribution of
wealth across all countries in the world
using a comprehensive concept of
household wealth. In everyday conversation
the term ‘wealth’ often signifies little
more than ‘money income’. On other
occasions economists interpret the term
broadly and define wealth to be the
value of all household resources, both
human and non-human. Our study assigns
wealth its long-established meaning of net
worth: the value of physical and financial
assets less debts. In this respect, wealth
represents the ownership of capital.
Although capital is only one part of
personal resources, it is widely believed
to have a disproportionate impact on
household wellbeing and economic
success, and more broadly on economic
development and growth.
The estimates of wealth levels are based
on household balance sheets and wealth
survey data which are available for 38
countries. Fortunately, these include many
of the rich OECD countries as well as the
three most populous developing countries,
China, India and Indonesia; so the data
cover 56 percent of the world’s population
and 80 percent of household wealth.
Careful analysis of the determinants of
wealth levels in these countries allows
imputations to be made for countries
without data.
The estimates of wealth distribution are
based on household asset distribution
data for 20 countries. For countries
without this type of direct information,
the degree of wealth concentration was
estimated from income distribution data
(where available), using the relationship
observed between income and wealth
inequality in countries with both kinds of
data. The remaining countries, covering
only a few percent of world population,
were assigned the average wealth
distribution pattern for their region and
income class.
Household wealth is more concentrated,
both geographically and in size
distribution when official exchange rates
are employed rather than purchasing
power parity (PPP) valuations. Thus a
somewhat different perspective emerges
depending on whether one is interested
in the power that wealth conveys in terms
of local consumption options or the
power to have influence on the world
financial stage. Since a large share of
global wealth is owned by people who can
readily travel and invest internationally,
it is more appropriate to use official
exchange rates when studying the
global distribution of wealth than when
looking at the global distribution of
income or poverty.
Global household wealth in the year 2000
amounted to $125 trillion, equivalent
to roughly three times global GDP or to
$20,500 per citizen of the world, by official
exchange rates. In terms of PPP dollars,
the corresponding world value was
PPP$26,000 per capita, roughly the same
as the average level in Poland or Turkey.
Wealth levels vary widely across nations.
Among the richest countries, mean
wealth was $144,000 per person in the
USA and $181,000 in Japan. Lower down
among countries with wealth data are
India, with per capita assets of $1,100,




The richest 2 percent
of adults in the world
held more than half of
global wealth.
The average person
in the top decile owns
nearly 3,000 times the
wealth of the average




but is generally high.
These are some key facts
in a new UN study on global
wealth distribution, which is
summarised here.
1. University of Western Ontario;
2. United Nations University – World Instititute for
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER);
3. New York University.4 International Poverty Centre
The regional pattern of asset holdings
shows wealth to be heavily concentrated
in North America, Europe, and high
income Asia-Pacific countries which
together account for almost 90 percent
of global wealth. Although North
America has only 6 percent of the world
adult population, it accounts for 34
percent of household assets. Europe
and high income Asia-Pacific countries
also own disproportionate amounts of
wealth. In contrast, the overall share
of wealth owned by people in Africa,
China, India, and other lower income
countries in Asia is considerably less
than their population share, sometimes
by a factor of more than ten.
Comparing per capita wealth and per
capita GDP across countries shows
that wealth is distributed even more
unequally than income. High income
countries tend to have a higher share of
world wealth than of world GDP because
their wealth to income ratios are above
the world average. The reverse is true of
middle and low income nations.
Wealth to income ratios are especially
high in the UK, Italy, and rich Asian
nations. Lower than expected values are
recorded for eastern European countries
like the Czech Republic and Poland, along
with the Nordic countries and South
Africa. Eastern European countries
are a heterogeneous group with many
different features. In this region, private
wealth is on the rise, but has still not
reached very high levels. Assets like
private pensions and life insurance are
held by relatively few households. In the
Nordic countries, the social security
system provides generous public pensions
that may depress wealth accumulation.
South Africa is rich in resources and has
well-developed financial institutions; but
the fact that the country has a large low-
income population and exhibits some of
the characteristics of less-developed
countries, may account for the low
wealth-income ratio.
Estimation of the world distribution
of wealth requires information to be
combined on wealth differences between
countries and within countries. The
concentration of wealth within countries
varies significantly, but is generally high.
The share of the top decile ranges from
around 40 percent in China to 70 percent
and beyond in the United States and certain
other countries. Typical Gini coefficients
for wealth lie in the range 0.65-0.75, and
some are above 0.8. In contrast, the mid-
range of income Ginis is 0.35 to 0.45.
Wealth inequality for the world as a
whole is higher still. Expressed in terms
of the adult population of the world, we
estimate that net assets of $2,160 per
adult in the year 2000 was sufficient to
place a household in the top half of the
world wealth distribution. At least
$61,000 per adult was needed to belong
to the richest 10 percent of households,
while membership of the top 1 percent
required a little over $500,000 per adult.
The latter figure indicates that a family
need only be moderately wealthy in
Western terms to be among the top
percentile of world wealth-holders.
Our results show that the top wealth
decile owned 85 percent of global wealth
in the year 2000. The richest 2 percent of
adults in the world held more than half
global wealth, and the richest 1 percent of
adults alone accounted for 40 percent
of all household assets. In contrast, the
bottom half of the world adult population
owned barely 1 percent of global wealth.
The Gini value for global wealth is
estimated to be 89 percent; the same
Gini value would be obtained if $100
were shared amongst 100 people in such
a way that one person receives $90 and
the remaining 99 get 10 cents each.
Given the high concentration of wealth
in North America, Europe, and rich Asia-
Pacific countries, it is not surprising to
discover that almost all of the world’s
richest individuals live in these countries.
The breakdown of the global wealth
distribution in the chart shows that the
Americas, Asia and Europe contribute
about one third of the members of the
world’s wealthiest decile. China occupies
much of the the middle third of the global
wealth distribution while India, Africa and
low-income Asian countries dominate the
bottom third. For all developing regions
of the world, the share of population
exceeds the share of global wealth, which
in turn exceeds their share of people who
are among the wealthiest in the world.
Major differences are observed across
countries in the composition of asset
holdings, a result of different influences
on household behaviour, such as market
structure, regulation and culture. Real
assets, particularly land and farm assets,
are more important in less developed
countries. This reflects not only the
greater importance of agriculture, but
also immature financial institutions.
The types of financial assets that are
owned also show striking differences
across countries. A breakdown between
savings accounts, shares and equities,
and other financial assets, shows that
savings accounts feature strongly in
transition economies and in some richPoverty In Focus   June 2007    5
Convergence and divergence between North and South
The gap between the North and the South widened continuously from 1950 to 1990, as is clear from the following chart. For Africa and Latin
America, the gap has continued to grow until the present; but since 1980, Asia, and China in particular, has been closing it. After 1990, the
faster growth of Asia as outweighed the relative decline of Africa and Latin America, and so, the relative position of the South as a whole has
very marginally improved. The contrast between these two opposed tendencies is a central feature of world distribution during the last two
or three decades.
The global income distribution is represented in the following graph, in which each vertical column represents the implicit income of one
decile of one country. The tallest building in the city, so to speak, in the rear corner of the graph, represents the income of the richest decile
of the population of the USA, while the scarcely visible column in the nearest corner of the graph represents the income of the poorest decile
of the population of Sierra Leone. The graph illustrates extreme global inequality, in particular of the very steep ascent from the poorer
majority of the world to its richer minority.
Bob Sutcliffe: A Converging or Diverging World? DESA Working Paper No. 2, UN, New York 2005.
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2005/wp2_2005.pdf
Asian countries, while share-holdings
and other types of financial assets are
more evident in rich countries in the
West. Part of the explanation is poorly
developed financial markets in transition
countries, while savings accounts are
favoured in Asian countries because
there appears to be a strong preference
for liquidity and a lack of confidence in
financial markets.
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly,
household debt is relatively unimportant
in poor countries. While many poor
people in poor countries are in debt,
their debts are relatively small in total.
This is mainly due to the absence of
financial institutions that allow
households to incur large mortgage and
consumer debts, as is increasingly the
situation in rich countries. Many people
in high-income countries have
negative net worth and—somewhat
paradoxically—are among the poorest
people in the world in terms of
household wealth. 
J. Davies, S. Sandström, A. Shorrocks,
E. N. Wolff: The Global Distribution of
Household Wealth. WIDER Angle No. 2,
2006. UNU-WIDER. http://www.wider.unu.
edu/newsletter/newsletter.htm
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in A. Maddison: The World Economy: A Millennial Perspecitve, OECD, 2003.
Note: The North = Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, USA and Western Europe; The South = the rest of the world
except for Eastern Europe and ex--USSR; Asia includes China, but not Japan.
Data source: World Development Indicators, 2005. Online version. World Bank, Washington D. C.6 International Poverty Centre
What is meant by
global inequality?
How large is it?
Is it increasing?
Why does it matter?
What can be done about it?
How much is due to
differences between
countries and how much
to within-country gaps?
Is there a link between
globalisation and global
inequality?
There are three main concepts of
global inequality that need to be clearly
distinguished, but are often confounded:
1) inequality among countries’ per capita
incomes, unweighted or 2) weighted by
countries’populations, and 3) inequality
between world individuals.
Concept 1 importantly deals with
convergence and divergence of countries’
average incomes, but not with income
inequality among all people in the world.
Economic growth in a small country will
not have the same effect on global
inequality as growth in a poor and
populous country. Concept 2 inequality
takes this into account by weighting
each country by its population. This
implicitly assumes that each individual
within a country receives the per capita
income. Thus, it does not take into
account within-country inequalities.
Concept 3 includes inequalities both
between and within countries.
Research using different techniques
indicates general agreement about the
size of Concept 3 inequality, but general
disagreement about its recent direction
of change. All Gini values for the 1990s lie
within a relatively narrow range between
63 and 68, with the exception of the two
extremes (61 and 71), and most of these
estimates are within one standard error
of each other.
How big is a Gini of around 65? It is larger
than inequality found in any single
country including South Africa and Brazil,
two of the most unequal countries in the
world with Ginis around 60. The Gini value
however does not give an intuitive feeling
of how large global inequalities are.
A better way to look at it is to consider
how global income is distributed across
different fractiles of the distribution.
Thus, the top 5 percent of individuals in
the world receive about one-third of total
world (PPP-valued) income, and the top
10 percent one-half. If we take the
bottom 5 and 10 percent, they receive
respectively 0.2 and 0.7 percent of world
total income. This means that the ratio
between the average income received
by the richest 5 percent and the poorest
5 percent of people in the world is 165
to 1. The richest people earn in about
48 hours as much as the poorest people
earn in a year.
Some studies find declining values from
the 1980s, others increasing. My own
findings are of zigzag movements, with an
increase of 3 Gini points 1988-93 followed
by a decline of 1 point by 1998, and then a
1 point increase by 2002. This is explained
first, around 1990, by the slow growth of
rural incomes in India and China and
economic collapse of Eastern Europe, both
of which contributed to global inequality.
When both developments reversed in the
next five-year period, global inequality
decreased. But these are zig-zags caused
by specific economic events in large
countries, not a trend.
Is there a link between globalisation
and global inequality? This is a very
contentious issue. Most agree on the
association of openness with enhanced
global growth but not on its distribution
between rich and poor countries. Rapid
growth in huge poor countries like China
and India is clearly reducing Concept 2
inequality and—although to a large
extent offset by increasing national
inequalities—probably also Concept 3
inequality, at least in some periods.
Globalisation’s impact on global
inequality varies with the position of
countries with different attributes along
the international income distribution at a
given point in time. The effect will depend
on where in the income hierarchy
populous countries are at a given point in
time. If  they are poor, globalisation will
reduce global inequality; if they are rich,
by Branko Milanovic,
the World Bank Global Income
InequalityPoverty In Focus   June 2007    7
the opposite may happen. The
relationship between globalisation and
global inequality is not generally valid,
but highly time-specific and contingent
on past income history.
How much of global inequality is due to
differences in mean incomes of countries
and how much to income differences
within countries? Some 70 percent of
present global inequality is due to
differences in countries’ mean incomes.
This is a sharp reversal from a situation
which existed around the time of the
Industrial Revolution when more than
half of the rough estimate of global
inequality was due to income differences
within nations.
Yet, some people in a poor country can
be better off than some people in a rich
country. The chart plots five countries’
distributions within the world one.
The top curve shows that the poorest
5 percent in Germany have a mean
income at the 73rd percentile of the world
income distribution; the richest 5 percent
are in the top percentile of the world.
For India, the span is from the 3rd to the
71st percentile in the world. These two
distributions do not overlap at all. But
if we compare Brazil and Germany, nearly
a third of all Brazilians are richer than the
poorest 5 percent of the Germans, and
so are over 200 million Chinese. The rich
Brazilians are about as rich as the richest
Germans, and much richer than the
richest 5 percent in India, on average.
The chart illustrates not only the
considerable inequality due to within-
country distributions, but also the practical
implications for global transfers. Transfers
from mean-income rich (OECD) to mean-
income poor countries, when we do not
a priori know who the beneficiaries are,
need to take recipient countries’ income
distributions seriously. The risk that
money from a German taxpayer will
benefit someone richer is higher if
German aid goes to Brazil than to India.
Global inequality matters, for various
reasons. From an ethical perspective,
distributional justice within a nation
and in the world as a whole is the same
thing. And pragmatically, globalisation
increases the awareness of other
people’s income and thus the perception
of inequalities among both the poor
and the rich. Even if globalisation
were to raise everybody’s real income,
it could exacerbate, rather than
moderate, feelings of despondency
and deprivation among the poor.
Thus, globalisation is just like the process
which led to the creation of modern nation
states out of isolated hamlets. National
income distribution was similarly an
abstraction for the people who did
not interact with each other, and almost
ignored each others’ existence and way of
life. However, once nation states came into
existence, national inequality became an
issue because people were able to observe
income differences. If the process of
globalisation would lead toward decision-
making processes at the global level, then
global inequality is indeed relevant.
Large income differences in the world are
due, as we have seen, mostly to the large
differences in countries’ mean incomes.
Since the early 1980s, many countries
of the world, viz. the poorest ones, have
witnessed a systematic growth failure.
Thus, to reduce income differences
among individuals, increasing the
growth rate in poor countries is of
paramount importance. Still, there
will be a need to reduce income
disparities through global redistribution.
Three basic progressivity rules should
guide global income redistribution.
Funds should flow from: (i) rich to poor
countries; (ii) a tax-payer who is richer
than the beneficiary of the transfer; and
(iii) tax payers who are relatively rich
within their own country to relatively
poor people in the recipient country, so
that inequality decreases in both donor
and recipient countries. This requires
consideration of national income
distributions with preference to poor and
egalitarian countries, since transfers to
them are unlikely to be globally regressive.
This calls for the creation of a global
agency to be financed by taxing rich
people in rich countries and that would
transfer funds to poor people in poor
countries. If empowered to raise its own
funds, it should eschew governments
that have often wasted foreign aid.
Instead, it should deal directly with
national NGOs and individual citizens in
poor countries and distribute collected
funds in the form of cash grants.
Vesting some modest tax-raising authority
for the first time in history into a global
agency would be a huge political challenge.
However, globalisation is rendering the
economic gaps more obvious and the
fairness of the existing global distribution
more questionable. Opponents will
ultimately realise that their self-interest lies
in supporting some form of global action
to deal with both poverty and inequality. 
Branko Milanovic: Global Income Inequality.
A review. World Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1,
Jan-March, 2006. See also http://www.un.org/
esa/desa/papers/2006/wp26_2006.pdf
Note: World population along vertical axis by percentile from poorest to richest.
Country populations along horizontal axis from poorest to richest, mean income by ventile (5 % group) in PPP dollars.
Source: Calculated from World Income Distribution (WYD) data  at: http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/inequality8 International Poverty Centre
An important stylised fact
has been absent from the
distributional analysis,
which  only reflects what
happens at the very top
and at the bottom of
the distribution.
The other half—in the
middle and upper-middle
of the distribution—offers




from the top to the bottom
of the income distribution.
One of the oldest political economy
controversies is about why countries have
such different income distributions. At
one end of the range of hypotheses the
focus is on anonymous market forces and
optimum equilibria that generate efficient
distributive outcomes; at the other end, the
focus is on different forms of exploitation
and power relations based on specific
types of structures of property rights
and incentives that favour some and
disadvantage others in a systematic way.
This short essay contributes to this debate
by highlighting a remarkable stylised fact
that has been absent from the analysis
around distributive diversity. This is that
the picture of the distributional diversity
across the world as measured in Gini
coefficients only reflects what happens
within half the world’s population—those
at the very top and those at the bottom.
The other half is characterised by a
remarkable distributional homogeneity.
The graph below suggests four ‘layers’ of
inequality across countries. First, a more
equal layer containing Central Europe
and the non-Anglophone OECD; a second
layer contains a great variety of regions,
with more than three-quarters of the
world’s population; a third one includes
Sub-Saharan Africa and the ‘second-tier’
NICs; and a fourth, Latin America.
However, as discussed in detail in Palma
(2006), one has to look ‘inside’ this Gini-
picture to be able to properly understand
cross-country distributional diversity, in
particular the remarkable difference
between income distribution in one half
of the world population (those at the very
top and at the bottom in each country)
and in the other (those in the middle).
Figure A (page 9) shows a particularly
close correlation between regional Ginis
and the income-shares of the top 10
percent; this is mainly the result of the
way the Gini index is calculated. In turn,
Figure B shows that the regional
distributional structure of the bottom
40 percent is the mirror image of that of
the Ginis and decile 10. Therefore, the Gini
indices are perfectly reflected both at the
very top and at the bottom of the
distribution of income.
However, when one looks at the other 50
percent of the world’s population, Figure C,
the ‘middle and upper-middle income
groups’, which are located between deciles
5-9, the regional distributional picture
changes completely: from huge disparity
to remarkable similarity. Furthermore,
as Figure D indicates, this distributive-
homogeneity is even more remarkable in
the ‘upper middle’ (the 30 percent located
between deciles 7-9). This contrast is
clearly shown by the coefficient of
variation; those of decile 10 and deciles
1-4 are nearly four times greater than that
for deciles 5-9 and seven times larger than
that for deciles 7-9.
Why is Inequality so
Unequal across
Countries?
by José Gabriel Palma,
University of Cambridge
LA=Latin America; AF=Sub-Saharan Africa; EA1=‘first-tier’ NICs; EA 2=‘second-tier’ NICs; SA=large South Asia and
low-income Southeast Asia; NA=North Africa; CA=Caribbean countries; OECD 1=English-speaking OECD; OECD
2=non-English-speaking OECD; ex-c 1=ex-communist countries of Central Europe; ex-c 2=ex-communist countries
of the former Soviet Union.
Regional figures are median values, based on a sample of 90 countries. The width of the X-axis corresponds to the actual
range of income per capita of the sample (from Ethiopia to Switzerland).
Source:  World Bank’s WDI data set.Poverty In Focus   June 2007    9
Thus, the half of the world population
belonging to the ‘middle classes’ seems to
be able to appropriate about half their
respective national incomes.  The apparent
paradox is that—often through very
different distributive mechanisms—they
seem to be able to acquire a similar
‘property right’ over half their national
incomes. They apparently do so regardless
of per capita incomes, political settlements,
institutional structures for rent-seeking, the
structure of property rights and incentives,
economic policies, or whether their
countries managed to get their prices,
institutions or social capital ‘right’!
No such luck for the bottom 40 percent of
the population. For them, such political
economy issues can make the difference
between getting as much as one-quarter
of national income (as in the non-
Anglophone OECD, or Central Europe),
or as little as just over 10 percent (Latin
America). As far as the top income decile
is concerned, the sky is (almost) the limit.
Thus, the regional distributional structure
suggested by the Gini indices only reflects
the income disparities at the very top and
at the bottom, but does not reflect the
remarkable distributional homogeneity
found in middle. This phenomenon raises
serious questions regarding how useful
the Gini index is as an indicator of overall
income inequality.
There are also major analytical implications
deriving from this phenomenon. In
particular, that recent political and
economic developments (including
globalisation) seem to have been
associated with two very different
distributional movements: a (better known)
‘centrifugal’ one in terms of the income-
shares of the top and bottom deciles, and
a (lesser known) ‘centripetal’ movement in
terms of the income-share of deciles 5-9.
Regional distributional homogeneity in
the middle and upper-middle of the
distribution also casts doubts on many
theories trying to explain the diversity
of income distributions across the world.
For example, mainstream theories tend to
emphasise the role of ‘human capital’ in
the determination of income distribution;
according to them, the level of education
is a crucial variable (if not the most crucial
variable) in the determination of income
inequality.  However, in all regions of the
world the top income decile is made up
of individuals with relatively high levels
of education, while those in the bottom
four deciles have relatively low levels of
formal education—in terms of  either
relatively little schooling, or (in the more
advanced countries), schooling of rather
doubtful quality.
So why is it that in the most
homogeneously-educated group (the top
income decile) one finds the greatest
distributional diversity?  In turn, why is
there extraordinary similarity in the shares
of national income of the educationally
highly heterogeneous population of
deciles 5 to 9 (heterogeneous, for
example, in terms of the share of
the population with secondary and
especially tertiary education)?
Obviously, more research needs to be
done on the forces shaping the national
income shares of these two halves of
the world population along such
different paths, particularly in such
opposite ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’
directions. Remarkably, this simple
observation does not seem to have
been emphasised before.
Finally, following this analysis, it seems
rather obvious that countries really
wishing to improve their income
distribution should focus their efforts on
how to transfer income from the very top
to the bottom of the income distribution.
One such policy, of course, would be to
strengthen workers’ property rights over
human capital—the strengthening of
workers’ property rights over basic skills
was one of the main mechanisms by
which most industrialised economies
transferred income from the top to
the bottom of the distribution (and
encouraged the accumulation of human
capital). In turn, the reversal of this policy
has been one of the main mechanisms
by which most developed countries
managed to increase their income
inequalities since the early 1980s. 
Palma, J. G. (2006): Globalising Inequality:
the ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ forces
at work. DESA Working Papers No. 35.
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/
wp35_2006.pdf10 International Poverty Centre
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gap to unskilled labour.
This article summarises
a model of globalisation as
cross-border production.
by  Michael Kremer,
Harvard University Globalisation and
Inequality within
Countries
Supporters of the anti-globalisation
movement argue that globalisation has
increased inequality between and within
nations and in particular that it has
marginalised the poor in developing
countries and left behind the poorest
countries. Meanwhile, more moderate
mainstream politicians argue that the
poor must invest in education to take
advantage of globalisation.
However, under a standard textbook
model, globalisation should benefit the
poor and reduce inequality, and the
poorest countries and least educated
workers should have the greatest
opportunity to benefit from globalisation.
The argument goes as follows. Suppose
there are two countries, the North, with a
high ratio of skilled to unskilled workers,
and the South, with a low ratio. Suppose
also high-skill and low-skill workers are
complements. Under autarky the wage
of skilled workers will be relatively low
in the skill-abundant North and relatively
high in the skill-scarce South. Opening
trade will equalise factor prices in the
two countries. Hence, the wage of skilled
workers will rise in the North and fall in
the South, while the wage of unskilled
workers will fall in the North and rise
in the South.
Thus inequality will rise in the rich country
and fall in the poor country. The extent
of, and gains from, trade will typically be
greater the scarcer are skills in the South.
Similar results obtain in a model with
capital and labour as the two inputs,
assuming labour is equally distributed
within each country while capital is not.
There are, however, at least two empirical
problems with this model. First, it predicts
that bilateral trade will be greatest when
factor endowments are most different; in
fact, there is little trade between
advanced countries such as the U.S.
and very poor countries such as Chad.
Second, evidence from specific developing
countries following trade liberalisation
and from cross-country studies does
not suggest that trade liberalisation
generally reduces inequality in poor
countries and in fact frequently suggests
that trade liberalisation is associated with
increased inequality.
For example, after Mexico embarked on a
broad liberalisation of trade and foreign
investment, the return to schooling
increased; white-collar real hourly wages
increased by 13.4 percent 1984-90, while
blue-collar wages fell by 14.0 percent. The
biggest rise in inequality was observed in
firms engaged in export industries. Rising
wage inequality in Mexico is linked to
capital inflows from abroad. Outsourcing
by Northern multinationals shifted
production towards skill-intensive goods,
increasing the relative demand for skilled
labour. Multinational firms and joint
ventures pay higher wages, with or
without adjustment for observable
correlates of skill.
Increased openness is associated with
reduced wage inequality in the Asian
Tiger economies in the 1970s and 1980s
but with increased inequality in Latin
America in the 1990s. Limited evidence
available for other countries indicates
that liberalisation tends to be followed
by increases in inequality, but causality
is doubtful. In several large countries,
e.g. India, China, Russia and Indonesia,
liberalisation had been only partial.
In the case of China global integration
has proceeded further in coastal than
in hinterland regions; this coincides
with increased coastal-hinterland wage
inequality, while Chinese regions that
experience a greater degree of openness
in trade also tend to have greater declines
in rural-urban income inequality.Poverty In Focus   June 2007    11
Most recent research finds either that
trade liberalisation is associated with
increased inequality in poor countries
or finds no strong association. The
relationship between openness and
inequality appears positive for low-
income countries and negative for high
income countries, with the turning point
occurring somewhere in a GDP per capita
range of $6000-$13,000.
In sum, the evidence does not support
the expected theoretical effects of
globalisation consistently reducing
inequality in poor countries. In basic
trade theory, two countries trade
produced goods with one another.
However, recently globalisation has to a
large extent also involved the production
process. A single product can be
manufactured out of components
made and assembled in different
countries, or designed in one country
and manufactured in another.
Workers in poor countries not only
produce labour-intensive products, but
also jointly produce with workers in rich
countries. This process is modelled in
the end-reference paper. In particular,
we model globalisation as cross-border
production; a product is designed in
one country, manufactured in a second
and customer services provided by a call
centre in a third country.
The model involves production by
workers of different skill-levels and is
consistent with (i) the small scale of
trade between countries with very
different factor endowments and
(ii) the possibility that globalisation
may increase inequality in both rich
and poor countries.
Our analysis assumes two countries and
just one consumption good. The rich
country has workers of two skill levels,
A and B. The poor country has workers
of skill levels C and D. We assume that the
A-D skill levels are in alphabetical order.
In a stylised two-type model this may
be a reasonable assumption. The lowest
quartile of the U.S. skill distribution may
well be higher than the highest quartile
of the Indian distribution; the presence of
small numbers of very high skill workers
in India or very low skill workers in the
U.S. makes little difference to our results.
The model implies that it is efficient (a) for
a firm to assign a higher-skill worker to
the managerial task and a lower-skill
worker to the assistant’s role, and (b) to
use cross-matching, i.e. workers with
different skill levels working in the same
firm, than self-matching, i.e. workers with
the same skill level working together.
Before globalisation, A- and B-workers
could be cross-matched, although not
necessarily, and the same for C- and
D-workers. But international matches
were not possible: for example, B- and
C-workers could not be cross-matched.
By contrast, after globalisation, all cross-
matches are in principle possible. Workers
from different countries can work
together in the same firm.
We assume that D-workers are of low
enough skill so that it is not efficient
for them to be cross-matched with any
worker in the rich country. That low-
skilled workers in poor countries have
difficulty participating in cross-border
matching is consistent with the
evidence. For example, call centres
in India tend to employ middle-class
Indians who can speak with an American
accent with which U.S. customers are
familiar. Multinationals and exporters
in developing countries typically pay
manufacturing wages substantially
above the norm for the country.
Globalisation potentially allows
efficiency gains through cross-border
production. If skill levels in the rich and
poor countries are sufficiently disparate,
then it is inefficient for any rich country
workers to match with any poor country
workers. Therefore the model offers a
clear explanation of why very little trade
is observed between the U.S. and Chad,
for example.
Furthermore, in this model globalisation
causes inequality in the poor country
(the gap between the wages of C- and
D-workers) either to increase or to remain
the same. The basic reason behind the
increase in inequality in poor countries
is the additional potential matches that
globalisation brings to each type of
worker. For C-workers, globalisation opens
more possible matches; for D-workers it
does not. In this sense D-workers can be
marginalised by globalisation in this model
if before globalisation they matched with
C-workers but are afterwards forced
to self-match.
The assumption that D-workers are so low
skilled that it is inefficient for them to be
involved in international matching is
important. For example, if before
globalisation C- and D-workers match,
while afterwards A- and C-workers match
and B- and D-workers match, then
globalisation has added new matching
possibilities for both C- and D-workers
and so no conclusion can be drawn about
inequality changes without considering
the exact values of A, B, C and D and the
numbers of workers of each type.
Similarly, without making stronger
assumptions, we cannot pin down what
effect globalisation has on inequality in
the rich country other than to say that
the wages of the A- and B-workers
cannot both go down; all other
combinations are possible.
Finally, observe that our model makes
no clear prediction on trends in global
inequality, even in the cases where
inequality increases within both rich
and poor countries. Precise results
depend on the relative numbers of A-,
B-, C-, and D-workers as well as on the
relative skill levels. However, if people
measure their status relative to others
in their own society, then they will
perceive inequality as increasing. This
analysis corresponds to the view of
many anti-globalisation protestors that
globalisation benefits elites in both rich
and poor countries.
Of course, while joint production may be
a good model of some types of trade, the
product trade model may be appropriate
in other cases. Low-end shoe factories in
poor countries may hire relatively low-
skill workers. Still, the presence of some
industries in which foreign investors
typically hire medium-skill workers who
are high-skill relative to others in their
country may help explain why there is
not a clear equalising effect of trade in
poor countries. 
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Inequality is a fundamental issue
for human development. Extreme
inequalities in opportunity and life
chance have a direct bearing on what
people can be and what they can do—
that is, on human capabilities. Children
facing a higher risk of death because
they are born into a poor household or
because they are girls clearly have less
opportunity to realize their potential.
Inherited disadvantage in opportunity
is wrong for intrinsic reasons: it violates
basic precepts of social justice. There are
also strong instrumental reasons for a
concern with inequality. Deep disparities
based on wealth, region, gender and
ethnicity are bad for growth, bad for
democracy and bad for social cohesion.
They are also bad for the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs
do not directly address inequality. In
this sense they are distribution neutral.
Progress is measured by aggregating
and averaging change at a national
level. In theory, the MDGs could be met
even if, say, households with low
incomes were falling behind on the
income poverty and health targets,
or if the rate of reduction in child
deaths among boys was sufficient
to compensate for a slower rate of
reduction among girls.
The distributional blind spot of the
MDGs is a weakness on two counts. First,
the MDGs themselves are rooted in ideas
about global justice and human rights.
They are universal entitlements, not
optional or discretionary allowances. It
follows that progress should be for all,
regardless of economic status, gender,
parents’ wealth or location in a country.
Yet the MDGs do not remind
governments that success in advancing
towards the MDGs should be measured
for all of society and not just in the
aggregate. The disparities hampering
progress towards the MDGs are systemic.
They reflect complex hierarchies of
advantage and disadvantage that are
transmitted across generations—and
they reflect public policy choices.
Secondly, poor people are being
left behind across many of the MDGs;
progress among the poorest 20 percent
of the population is far below the
national average in a large group of
countries. Apart from being unjust, this is
suboptimal from the perspective of MDG
attainment. People who are poor account
for a far larger share of deprivation than
people who are not. It follows that
accelerated progress among poor people
is one of the most effective routes to
faster national progress. Current patterns
are slowing the overall advance because
the smallest gains are being registered
among the households that account for
the biggest part of the problem.
These considerations have important
implications for the design of MDG
strategies. The evidence shows that a
“trickle down” approach to reducing
disparities and maintaining overall
progress will not work. The MDGs set
quantifiable targets that lend themselves
to policy responses rooted in technical
and financial terms. Ultimately, however,
the real barriers to progress are social
and political. They are rooted in unequal
access to resources and distribution of
power within and among countries.
Unless these inequalities are corrected,
the first principles of the Millennium
Declaration—commitment to social
justice, equity and human rights—from
which the MDGs are derived will not be
translated into progress in human
development at the required rate.
From a human development perspective
there are a range of mutually reinforcing
intrinsic and instrumental reasons why
by Kevin Watkins,
United Nations
Development Programme Inequality and
Human DevelopmentPoverty In Focus   June 2007    13
inequality matters. These can be broadly
summarized under five headings:
Social justice and morality. The view that
there are limits to tolerable deprivation
is fundamental to most societies and
value systems. All major religions
express concerns with equity and
place obligations on their adherents
to address extreme deprivation as a
moral duty. Public ideas reflect wider
normative concerns. Surveys show
strong opinions in many countries that
the gap between rich and poor is too
large, thus indicating an underlying
perception of social justice.
Putting the poor first.  More weight
should be given to improvements
in the well-being of the poor and
disadvantaged than to the rich and
privileged. National income is not a
good measure of welfare, because it
ignores the distribution of income.
Beyond income, many of the same
arguments apply. For example, an
additional unit of public spending
directed towards reducing child deaths
or extending access to primary school
would be preferable on social grounds
to a similar amount spent on transfers to
services for high-income groups.
Growth and efficiency. Extreme inequality
is not just bad for poverty reduction—it is
also bad for growth. Long-run efficiency
and greater equity can be complementary.
Poor people remain poor partly because
they cannot borrow against future
earnings to invest in production, the
education of their children and assets to
reduce their vulnerability. Insecure land
rights and limited access to justice can
create further barriers to investment and
pro-poor growth.
Political legitimacy. Extreme inequalities
also weaken political legitimacy and
corrode institutions. Inequalities in
income and human capabilities often
reflect inequalities in political power.
Poor people (especially women), rural
populations and indigenous
communities are disadvantaged partly
because they have a weak political voice,
and vice versa. Where political
institutions are seen as perpetuating
unjust inequalities or advancing the
interests of elites, democracy and
stability can be undermined.
Public policy goals. Most societies see
reducing poverty and removing unjust
inequalities as important goals for public
policy. Extreme disparities undermine the
pursuit of these goals, and limit the rate
at which growth can be converted into
poverty reduction. Similarly, extreme
disparities in health and education
reduce the scope of disadvantaged
groups to take advantage of
opportunities for improving welfare.
The appropriate response is to ensure
that inequality and the measures to
overcome disparities in life chances
figure more prominently in the design
of poverty reduction strategies.
Inequalities in income reflect the
distribution of assets and opportunity
and the operation of markets. But they
are influenced by government taxation
and spending. In many countries fiscal
transfers are already narrowing extreme
inequalities. In Chile, for example, they
narrow the gap between the income
ratios of the richest and the poorest
20 percent of the population from 20:1
to 10:1. From a human development
perspective the fiscal transfers with the
highest returns are investments that
build capabilities and provide protection
during periods of acute vulnerability
An obvious requirement for meaningful
fiscal transfers to alleviate poverty is the
willingness—and capacity—of the state
to mobilize revenue. In much of Latin
America aversion to taxation restricts this
condition. Mexico raises only 13 percent
of GDP in revenue—less than Senegal
does. India’s capacity to redistribute the
benefits of higher growth through the
fiscal system is similarly constrained by
a tax to revenue ratio of only 10 percent.
After two decades of growth that ratio
has not increased.
Fiscal transfer is one mechanism for
raising the income of the poor above
the level dictated by current growth
and distribution patterns. More broadly,
pro-poor growth requires a public
investment focus on the markets in
which poor people operate. In many
countries the challenge is to shift the
policy focus to the smallholder producers
and to the more marginal areas that
account for the bulk of poverty.
Control over assets is critical. It is
sometimes argued that there is a
potential trade-off in agriculture
between greater equity through land
reform and greater growth. Here too the
trade-offs are more apparent than real.
Redistributive reforms in agriculture
have proven results in reducing poverty,
leading to major advances in many
countries. In West Bengal, India, agricultural
output and incomes rose following
tenancy reform and recognition of
the land rights of the poor. 
Inequality and Human Development.
Chapter 2 of UNDP Human Development
Report 2005. http://hdr.undp.org/reports/
global/2005/pdf/HDR05_chapter_2.pdf Source:  UNDP Human Development Report 2005, page 57.14 International Poverty Centre
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by Elizabeth A. Stanton,
Tufts University
This histogram shows all rank changes from HDI to IHDI; five countries kept the same rank, 22 had worse ranks
by IHDI, and the remaining 19 had better ranks. The average absolute change in rank was 3.3, which is quite large
for only 46 countries.
Inequalities in health, education,
and income—key components of human
development—matter deeply to social
well-being. Yet the best-known measures
of well-being either ignore distributional
inequalities altogether or at best account
for only some of their effects. Per capita
income, the most common measure, is a
simple average. Its main alternative, the
UNDP Human Development Index (HDI),
is likewise based on national averages,
albeit for a wider set of welfare indicators.
The practice of identifying averages with
national well-being ignores potential
trade-offs between increasing averages
and decreasing differences in distribution.
For example, as the rich get richer,
average income may increase, but
income inequality simultaneously may
increase so sharply that the incomes of
the poor decline, arguably resulting in a
decrease in well-being. More generally,
measures based solely on national
averages record unambiguous changes
in well-being in circumstances made
ambiguous by changes in inequality.
HDI is derived from three component
indices: health, as proxied by average life
expectancy; education, as proxied by a
weighted average of literacy and school
enrollment rates; and income per capita,
using the natural logarithm in order to
account for the diminishing marginal
utility of income. The rationale for HDI is
that average health and education are
not simple functions of average income
per capita. There are two reasons for this.
First, health and education have a
substantial public goods component;
they are not private goods, distributed
entirely according to income. Publicly
provided goods and services may be
unequally distributed as well, because
access to them is politically driven and
affected by discrimination on the basis
of race, ethnicity, religion, or gender.
Because inequalities in the distribution
of health and education have negative
effects on human well-being, and are not
simply a function of income inequality,
they too should enter into measures of
social welfare.
Second, if privately-provided goods and
services for health and education purposes
diminish on the margin as income rises (i.e.
when the relationship between individual
income and individula health/education is
concave in mathematical terms), then
countries with the same average income
but different income distributions will have
different levels of average health and
education; the country with greater income
inequality will have lower average health
and education levels, and hence a lower
HDI. This is called the “aggregation effect”
of income inequality on health and
education. It implies that a redistribution of
income would change the average level
of health and education.
Thus, HDI’s inclusion of average
health and education goes some way
toward capturing the effects of income
inequality on well-being. But it fails to
account for other well-being effects of
income inequality, as well as for relevant
effects of inequalities in the distribution
of health and education outcomes.
For example, inequalities in all three
components of HDI may have corrosive
effects on social well-being through their
association with decreasing socialPoverty In Focus   June 2007    15
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the reference study.
cohesion, increasing violence, or
increasing environmental degradation.
Moreover, there is evidence that many, if
not all, people put some intrinsic value
on limiting inequality as an end in itself.
With the exception of gender disparities,
the inequality measures sporadically
reported in the UNDP HumanDevelopment
Report (HDR) have been restricted
exclusively to income distribution, and
none have been incorporated into the
HDI itself. The first HDR stated that all
three average measures of human
development “conceal wide disparities
in the overall population,” but that
compared to income inequality, the
“inequality possible in respect to life
expectancy and literacy is much more
limited: a person can be literate only
once, and human life is finite.” Although
health and education inequalities are
quantitatively more limited than income
inequality, the replacement of binary
variables, like literacy and school
enrollment, with continuous variables,
like years of schooling, allows for the
detection of more inequality.
A ranking of countries by HDI differs from
ranking by per capita income, because
(i) average life expectancy and education
register the effects of income distribution,
and (ii) health and education levels are
determined in part by non-income
factors, in particular public provision
of social services. While these effects
make HDI a better measure of social
welfare than per capita income, three
additional ways in which inequality can
affect well-being are missing from HDI:
 The aggregation effects of inequality
in health and education on individual
welfare (as opposed to the
aggregation effects of inequality in
income on health and education);
 Shifts in the way individual well-
being is related to personal income,
health and education, due to the
effects of inequality of other welfare-
relevant factors that are not included
in the HDI; and
 Inequality’s intrinsic negative effects
on social well-being.
For these reasons, it is both desirable
and feasible to reformulate the HDI
to push the boundaries of well-being
measurement beyond national averages.
An Inequality-adjusted Human
Development Index (IHDI) can
incorporate several new elements that
make HDI more sensitive to inequality.
First, in IHDI, social welfare functions with
respect to health, education, and income
are modeled with diminishing marginal
returns to individual welfare to capture
the aggregation effects of inequality.
Second, IHDI can vary the weights of
individuals in calculating social well-being
so as to reflect the degree of emphasis
on equality. Third, Gini coefficients are
used to adjust the resulting composite
indices—in a way that maintains balance
between the components—to take into
account further instrumental and
intrinsic costs of inequality beyond the
aggregation effect.
GDP per capita and HDI are commonly
used as measures of social welfare to
indicate which countries’ policies have
been the most effective in providing the
best quality of life. When social welfare is
measured without reference to inequality,
these rankings incorporate conceptual
flaws. HDI thus ranks some countries, like
South Korea, too unfavourably, and
others, like Brazil, too favourably.
Because distributional inequalities are
omitted from HDI, progress in improving
social welfare may be overlooked—as may
certain kinds of deterioration of social
welfare. IHDI can both provide a better
ranking of countries at any given time
and better illuminate changes in social
welfare over time. While the data necessary
to calculate IHDI are not yet available for
the full set of countries covered in the
HDRs, the IHDI proposal provides a
roadmap to a more robust measure of
social welfare for use in international
and inter-temporal comparisons. 
Stanton, Elizabeth A.: Accounting for
Inequality: A Proposed Revision of the
Human Development Index. Working Paper
No. 119, November, 2006. PERI: Amherst,
Mass. http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/
pdf/ working_ papers/working_papers_101-
150/WP119.pdf16 International Poverty Centre
Horizontal inequalities are
important because they
affect well-being and can
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powerful grievances that
leaders can use to mobilise
people to political protest.
It should be measured
and monitored.
When acute, policies
are needed to counter
such inequalities.










among culturally defined groups
encompass economic, social, political
and cultural dimensions. They are
important because they affect well-
being and can lead to violent conflict.
Yet almost all economic analysis and
measurement of inequality, e.g. the Gini
coefficient, concerns vertical inequality
among individuals, while group
inequality tends to be ignored.
People can be grouped in many ways,
and most people are members of many
groups including national, racial,
ethnic, religious, gender and age
categorisations. These may emerge
from self-identification, legislation,
and/or as a result of categorisation by
others. There are also many groups of
which membership is short-lived—such
as social clubs, or producer networks,
and so on.
Some group affiliations are clearly
more important than others in terms of
people’s identity, their permanence and
the impact on access to resources.
While group boundaries are to some
extent arbitrary, socially constructed
and fluid, nonetheless some group
affiliations are salient, affecting
peoples sense of self, their welfare and
their political affiliations. The group
forms part of a person’s identity, and
relative impoverishment of the group
increases perceptions of members that
they are likely to be permanently
trapped in poverty.
In addition to being important in itself,
reducing HIs may help achieve other
objectives. One is efficiency:
discrimination is likely to lower efficiency,
since a number of talented people will be
held back while resources and high
positions go to less talented people in
the favoured group. Also, poverty
reduction may require tackling the
position of the group. For example,
programmes to advance credit to poor
producers, or to promote universal
education, may not be achievable so
long as group inequality remains, e.g in
attitudes towards women’s rights and
girls’ education.
Group inequality provides powerful
grievances that leaders can use to
mobilise people to political protest, by
calling on cultural markers (a common
history or language or religion) and
pointing to group exploitation. This is
especially likely where there is political as
well as economic inequality, so that the
leaders are excluded from political power,
for example Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda,
Northern Ireland, Chiapas, and the Sudan.
HIs are an important source of grievance
and potentially of instability, independently
of the extent of vertical inequality.  Whether
HIs lead to political violence or not
depends on a number of factors, e.g.
the nature of the HIs, which can be
categorised into four areas: political
participation, economic resources, social
services, and cultural recognition.
While these categories are applicable
to every society, the elements that are
relevant in a particular case depend on
the nature of the society, its political
system, economy, and social structure.
For example land is clearly of
paramount importance in the rural
economies of Africa but not in modern
urban societies, while employment
seems to be important in most
countries. In natural resource rich
economies, the control over such
resources, either directly or via the state,
is an important source of group rivalry.
Access to housing is of critical
importance in more developed
economies, such as Northern Ireland,
but less so where people mostly
construct their own homes, e.g. in Africa.Poverty In Focus   June 2007    17
Tackling horizontal inequalities in Malaysia
Malaysia faced large economic HIs between the Chinese and Malay (Bumiputera)
populations. Following anti-Chinese riots in 1969, the government introduced reforms
to reduce HIs and thus secure national unity. Policies included expanding the Malay
share of capital ownership through low-interest credit allocations; settling Malays
on 95 percent of new lands; and quotas in access to education. Inequalities were thus
reduced in incomes, capital ownership and education. Conflict was avoided, even after
the 1997 financial crisis when other countries in the region faced anti-Chinese violence.
Moreover, there was high growth and rapid poverty reduction. Political HIs favoured the
majority Malays, facilitating the comprehensive and effective policy reforms.
Strong causal connections between
different HIs cause and perpetuate HIs.
For example, HIs in political power often
lead to similar social and economic
inequalities through biased access to
government jobs and services. There are
also mutual linkages between economic
and social elements, e.g. education and
economic opportunities, thus reinforcing
cycles of privilege and deprivation.
HIs may be spatially distributed, which
can lead to separatist claims where
resource rich provinces seek autonomy,
resenting the redistribution of local
resources to other parts of the country
(for example, Biafra in Nigeria, or Aceh in
Indonesia). Yet, sometimes the poorer
regions feel exploited by the richer areas
(for example, in Bangladesh and Eritrea).
Different types of conflict emerge where
people from competing groups live in
the same geographic area.  In such cases,
the deprived may seek political and
economic rights or control over
government institutions. Similarly, there
may be attacks on particular groups and
pressure for ethnic cleansing without
direct government involvement.
The violent conflict in Cote d’Ivoire,
the long war in Guatemala and the
genocide in Rwanda are examples where
deep political and socio-economic HIs
were an important cause of the group
violence. However, in Malaysia and
Northern Ireland effective policies were
introduced to reduce HIs, in each case
contributing to peace.
While the existence of HIs, especially
when consistent in political and
economic dimensions, is likely to lead to
political mobilisation on group lines,
whether there is conflict or not depends
on other factors, including cultural,
demographic, economic and political
conditions (especially the nature of
the state).
The potential strength of any violent
movement depends on the relative size
of the population in different groups. At
one extreme where there are many small
groups they find it difficult to mobilise
collectively, while if the population is
homogeneous violence may be less
likely. In between there are many
possibilities. Where an underprivileged
group is a small minority, any violent
protest is likely to be readily suppressed
or may not occur (as in the northern part
of Kenya or among the Roma people in
Europe). Where there is small privileged
group and a large underprivileged one,
the majority can be mobilised against the
privileged—the Jews and the Chinese
and the Lebanese, for example, have
been subject to such attacks periodically
over many centuries.
Another important factor is the cohesion
of the group; strong cohesion and hence
mobilisation potential may be the
outcome of cultural unity, or of political
leadership emphasising group unity.
However, cohesion is inherently easier in
some contexts. For example, where there
is cultural fragmentation (e.g. many
languages being spoken), mobilisation
behind some overarching identity may be
less likely, and geographic dispersion may
also make cohesion less likely. Thus, in
Peru, an overarching affiliation could be an
‘indigeneous’ identity which would bring
together about half the population—
a clearly powerful political entity. Yet
differences within the indigenous
population as to language, history,
location may mean that such an
overarching identity is not strongly felt
and hence political action on the basis of
indigeneity may be unlikely.
The nature of the economy is another
type of conditioning factor which helps
determine the outbreak (or not) of violent
conflict. Impoverished societies seem to
be more prone to violence according
to econometric investigations. This may
reflect lack of viable occupations among
poor populations, who therefore find war
an attractive proposition; or lack of state
resources which means that the state
offers little to its citizens which might
lead them to respect their civic
obligations; or that weak states that are
unable to repress violence effectively.
Low growth economies seem to be more
violence prone than high growth. This is
probably because with higher growth all
groups benefit, and so inequalities seem
to matter less.
Another factor is the presence of natural
resources which has been shown to make
conflict more likely. Natural resources
often lead to quite acute HIs—often
geographic—between those with access
to the resources and those without.
General investigation of country cases
shows that HIs are important both as
a source of conflict and because they
reduce welfare. They should be
measured and monitored and, where
they are acute, policies introduced to
counter them. But caution is needed.
Countering HIs can itself provoke
conflict from the groups whose
privileges are being reduced—as seems
to have been one factor behind the
conflict in Sri Lanka. Moreover the
political conditions for the sort of
comprehensive and systematic policies
needed are rare. But leaving HIs to fester
is dangerous, in Northern societies as
well as in Southern. Monitoring and
tackling HIs should be part of the
development agenda, along with other
development objectives including
growth and poverty reduction.
Stewart, F.: Horizontal Inequality: a Neglected
Dimension of Development. Helsinki:
WIDER Annual Development Lecture 2002.
Stewart, F., G. Brown and A. Langer (2007):
Policies towards HIs, CRISE Working Paper 42,
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It is not a matter of choosing
between labour and transfer
strategies, but of recognising
them as complementary.
We know a lot about the poor
but little about the rich, who
should provide the resources
for redistribution.
Learning more about the rich
is important for improving




Economic growth is a very temping
strategy to combat poverty. After all
growth can be good for everyone. At
least in theory, with growth both the
poor and the rich can win, thus avoiding
any serious distributive conflicts. And
even if growth comes accompanied by
increases in inequality—as seems to be
the most common case with accelerating
growth—it can still improve the life of
everyone. However, what is a possibility
has become almost a mantra: growth is
good for the poor.
If it is good for the poor, it is welcome.
But good does not mean best and the
fact is that in many countries realistic
growth rates will not be sufficient to
eradicate income poverty within a
reasonable time frame of two to three
decades. If middle-income countries like
South Africa, Peru and the Philippines do
not reduce inequality, they may double
their GDP and still have more than 10
percent of their population living below
a $2/day income threshold; low-income
countries like Kenya would have such
poverty ratios above 20 percent and
India would be above the 30 percent
level. The calculation here is simple: if the
economy grows without changes in
inequality, the headcount ratio for the
extreme poverty threshold of a $1/day
will be the share of the population under
the $2/day poverty line after the
duplication of the domestic product.
Where increasing the average level of
income is not sufficient, it is necessary
also to better distribute the existing
resources. For many developing
countries income poverty is not a
problem of generalized scarcity of
resources but mainly a matter of skewed
distribution of national income. Much
of the poverty in the world could be
reduced if there were less inequality in
these countries. This is particularly true in
highly unequal middle income countries
in Africa and Latin America, such as South
Africa, Botswana, Colombia, Brazil, Chile
or Mexico, in which 5 percent of the
income of the richer decile of the
population is sufficient to double or
even quadruplicate the income of the
poorest decile, according to the HDR 2005
data on poverty and inequality.
It is not just a matter of having less
inequality. Destroying the wealth of the
rich reduces inequality but it is hard to
see how this would help the poor. The
type of inequality reduction these
countries need is the one that results
in increases of the income of the poor.
There are countless ways to do it and
of course there is no “one-size-fits-all”
solution to this problem, but basically
such increase can be obtained by raising
the labour earnings of the poor and
raising social transfers.
Urban and rural land reforms, better
access to credit and markets, labour
market regulation, production subsidies
and the remodelling of control agencies
and bureaucracies can and should be
used to increase labour earnings. But not
all the poor would be benefited by these
measures. In some cases they have
limited scope and affect only certain
occupational groups or regions. In other
cases they have to be complemented by
so many structural changes in the
production and distribution of
commodities that in practice isolated
policies are of little use.
Moreover, changes in the demand for
labour will hardly be sufficient to
eradicate poverty if they are not
accompanied by changes in the supply,
which involves increasing the skills of
the poor workers and allowing them to
freely migrate to areas and countries
where they can find better jobs.Poverty In Focus   June 2007    19
Improving the labour earnings of the
poor requires not only a good effort, but
also some time. Not all alternatives to
reducing inequality by increasing the
labour income of the poor will bring
substantial results in the relatively short
period of twenty or so years. For
example, it takes more than ten years to
educate a cohort of children and even
countries that may accomplish a large
expansion in their educational systems
will have to wait many more years until
the new generations of educated
workers become a majority in the labour
market. Parallel to that, these countries
will also have to change the production
and occupational structures to reduce
segmentation and absorb new waves
of educated workers. This may take a
long time as well.
The poor cannot wait that long. If the idea
of eradicating poverty in a reasonable
time frame of two to three decades is to
be taken seriously, direct redistribution
will be inevitable. Improving the labour
earnings of the poor is crucial but for
the present generations it will hardly be
enough to drastically reduce poverty;
as a consequence, income has to be
directly redistributed to the poor via
social transfers. It is not a matter
of choosing between labour and
transfers but of recognizing they
are complementary strategies.
Redistribution means to take income
from one group and give it to another.
In the last twenty years there was an
impressive progress in terms of
knowledge about the group that will be
benefited by this redistribution, the poor.
Ethnographers, statisticians, sociologists,
economists and a multitude of other
professionals have visited, mapped
and described the poor, analysing their
habits and even testing their behaviours
experimentally. However, little is known
about the group that preferably should
provide the resources for redistribution,
i.e. the rich.
Indeed, the rich receive so little attention
from researchers that even operational
definitions of the group need to be
better developed. Take, for instance, the
ever increasing sophistication in the
debate about poverty lines. Drawing
such lines allows the stratification of the
population and is one of the fist steps in
any statistical study of poverty. There is
much in the literature about the methods
do draw absolute, relative, objective,
subjective, uni- and multidimensional
poverty lines but not so many attempts
to draw richness or affluence lines
having redistribution in mind.
Many years ago the first studies of the
poor had to overcome huge obstacles.
But thanks to the ingenuity of a large
number of scholars, today there are
several tools that allow us to identify
and aggregate the poor, analyze the
determinants of poverty and estimate
the possible impacts of public policies on
poverty. The study of the rich can benefit
from these previous efforts. With few
adaptations, the tools used to study
poverty can be easily applied on the
research about the rich.
Data, however, is still a problem. In the
developing countries the existing survey
questionnaires were not designed to
correctly collect data on the wealth and
income of the richest groups of the
population, although many of these
surveys have very long and detailed
sections on the income and assets of the
poor. This limitation, however, does not
prevent research in these countries.
Even underestimating incomes and
assets, the existing household surveys
can bring us useful information about
the rich. For instance, they allow us to
seek answers to questions that are
extremely important for theories of
justice and, therefore, for egalitarian
public policies: How fluid is the
transition between the non-rich and
the rich strata? Does regular education
open to everyone the opportunity to
become rich? How strong is the role
of dynasties for generational mobility?
What is the composition of the income
of the rich? What are their consumption
and saving patterns?
Most of these questions can be explored
using data that is already available.
Although not perfect, this data should be
used because, as in any other field of
research, a growing number of studies
may justify improvements in data
collection and lead to the development
of better theories to understand social
inequality. And, of course, surveys are not
the only source of data to study the rich.
There are studies that lay hold of tax
information, some government
administrative records and data from
companies, but most of them refer to
highly developed countries. Similar
studies in developing countries are
still in their infancy.
Different from the “positive-sum game”
promised by growth, redistribution has
winners and losers and consequently is
associated with conflicts of interest.
Because of the interests it affects, it can
hardly happen without imposition by the
state. Therefore, redistribution has also a
political dimension, in addition to the
economic one. The rich have power and
use it to gain or maintain economic
advantages. However, what seems an
obvious fact actually requires more
detailed analysis so the mechanisms that
link political power to wealth can be fully
understood. The approach used by a
large number of studies about social
networks and social capital of the poor
seem to be a promising path to
understand where the political power
of the rich comes from, how it relates to
their wealth and how it can block
redistribution initiatives.
It is true that there is some discomfort
among economists about approaching
the rich—surprisingly, since the study
of elites has been consolidated as a field
of political science for almost a century.
But the fact is that to better understand
inequality and what can be done to
reduce it, the rich must be increasingly put
on the research agenda of development
studies. There is a need for information
about who they are, what makes them
rich, how they use their wealth, what
happens with their consumption and
investment when they are taxed, what
are the relations they have with the
state, how much political power they
have and use, how they benefit from
public policies and so on. By knowing
more about the rich we will be better
prepared to improve the life of the poor.
M. Medeiros: Poverty, inequality and
redistribution: A methodology to define
the rich. IPC Working Paper No. 18, 2006.
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/
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kinds of inequality might
create some political
common ground between
the extreme modes of
public opinion.
Outside Latin America, where most
people view it as an unambiguously bad
thing, there is no universal consensus
that all inequality is unjust. This is true in
academic and policy circles, as well as in
the broader popular opinion. The World
Values Survey once asked people in 69
countries whether incomes should be
made more equal or, instead, whether
larger differences were needed as
incentives for individual effort. Answers
could take any one of ten values,
between those two “extreme” views.
The distribution of responses was bipolar:
40 percent of respondents were evenly
divided between the two extremes with
no pattern in between.
The phrasing of the survey question
itself was revealing. A positive view of
inequality is usually associated with
rewards and incentives for the
application of effort. On the other hand,
negative views tend to be stronger if
the inequalities in question involve
opportunities. Many people might be
less offended by inequality they see
as caused by differences in work habits
and personal responsibility, than by
inequality attributed to differences in
initial life chances, due to factors such
as gender, race or family wealth.
The concept of inequality of opportunity
has a long and distinguished history.
Franklin D. Roosevelt once stated that
“We know that equality of individual
ability has never existed and never will,
but we do insist that equality of
opportunity still must be sought.”
Economists like John Roemer have
suggested that equal opportunities
would be attained in a situation where
individual advantage is independent from
circumstances—exogenous attributes
over which individuals have no control,
such as family background, place of birth,
etc. In the words of Vito Peragine:
“according to the opportunity egalitarian
ethics, economic inequalities due
to factors beyond the individual
responsibility are inequitable and
to be compensated by society,
whereas inequalities due to personal
responsibility are equitable and not
to be compensated.”
Such a decomposition of observed
inequalities into a component due
to pre-determined circumstances and
another due to individual effort might
be helpful in a number of ways. Clarity
about the different kinds of inequality
might create some political common
ground between the extreme modes of
public opinion. It might also help shed
new light on the muddled debate about
the relationship between inequality and
growth. Perhaps one reason why the
empirical evidence on the causal effect
of past income inequality on subsequent
economic growth is so ambiguous is that
there really are two offsetting effects:
while “good” inequality rewards effort
and leads to better performance, “bad”
inequality wastes human potential by
denying certain groups the opportunity
to invest in themselves. Like cholesterol,
there may be more than one kind
of inequality.
The distinction may even help
policymakers choose between more
and less efficient forms of redistribution:
policies that reduce inequality of
opportunity affect the premia to
different predetermined circumstances,
and so should give rise to fewer
incentive problems. Policies that attack
outcome inequalities by taxing the fruits
of effort, rather than by leveling the
playing field, are likely to be costlier.
On the other hand, there may be a
danger in overstating the conceptual
differences. Today’s outcomes clearly
affect tomorrow’s circumstances. Large
Inequality as
Cholesterol
by Francisco H. G. Ferreira,
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permissible inequalities arising from
differences in efforts in one generation
may lead to morally unacceptable
inequalities in opportunity for the next.
Be that as it may, a practical problem
with this concept is that inequality of
opportunity could not be measured
until recently. Given the perils and
pitfalls of household surveys, it seemed
challenging enough just to get the
measurement of income inequality right.
How was one to capture the distribution
of “opportunities”, which by definition are
potential, rather than actual, in nature?
Roemer’s distinction between
circumstances and efforts as
determinants of advantage has helped
considerably. Recent studies have
attempted to quantify the share of
inequality that might be attributable to
economically exogenous circumstances.
Most of these studies share the same
basic approach: they select a number
of observable circumstance variables
like gender, race, place of birth and family
background; divide the population into
groups that have identical circumstances;
and calculate the share of total inequality
which is accounted for by inequality
between the groups. This share is a
measure of inequality of opportunity.
Two challenges come immediately to
mind: (i) researchers do not observe all
income  determinants—some inequality
is always due to unobserved efforts and
circumstances, and there is no way to
distinguish between those; (ii) these
unobserved variables may be correlated
with their observed counterparts, making
it difficult to identify the true individual
effects of each observed circumstance.
A study of male earnings inequality in
urban Brazil uses a simulation approach
to help address the second problem;
it measures the opportunity share of
inequality corresponding to the effect
of five observed circumstances, namely
race, place of birth, father’s occupation,
mother’s education and father’s
education. Between 10 and 37 percent
of observed earnings inequality could be
attributed to differences in opportunities,
driven solely by these five characteristics.
The same study recognizes two channels
though which circumstances can affect
outcomes. There can be a direct impact,
as when two equally productive workers
receive different pay, because of race or
gender differences. But there can also be
an indirect impact, as when a person
from a disadvantaged background exerts
less effort, often as a result of the
rational expectation of future
discrimination. On average, the study
found that 40 percent of the overall
effect of circumstances on earnings
inequality operates indirectly—through
differences in the distribution of efforts
conditional on circumstances.
Earnings and incomes are not the only
advantages a person might enjoy.
Cognitive achievement arising from
education is another example of an
important outcome that is affected both
by individual effort and by initial
circumstances. An ongoing study of
student achievement in standardized
math tests for five Latin American
countries finds that a sizable proportion
of variation in educational achievement
can be associated with unequal
opportunities. For the four countries with
complete data (Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Mexico), 43-56 percent of total
variation is due to inequality between
groups defined by the gender of the
child; the location of the school; mother’s
education and father’s occupation. When
individual attributes are considered
separately, the family background
variables (father’s occupation and
mother’s education) play the larger role.
Consistent with what we know about
gender and schooling in Latin America,
the gender of the student is of almost
no relevance. Spatial differences are still
important, particularly in Mexico.
A cross-country comparison is
also informative. There is no direct
correspondence between the overall
levels of inequality in test scores and their
opportunity shares. Mexico, for instance,
has approximately half of Brazil’s inequality
in test scores, but a greater opportunity
share. There are also differences in the
salience of specific circumstance variables:
whereas mother’s education is the most
important in Mexico, father’s occupation
dominates in Argentina.
While the findings for education are
preliminary, taken together with the
earlier results on earnings, they do
suggest that credible decompositions of
inequality into “opportunity” and “effort”
components are increasingly feasible.
Just as distinguishing between good and
bad cholesterol is important in choosing
the best policy for your heart, this
distinction may become relevant for
choosing what inequalities to combat,
and how best to do so. 
F. Bourguignon, F. Ferreira and M. Menéndez
(2003): Inequality of Outcomes and
Inequality of Opportunities in Brazil, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3174.
http://econ.worldbank.org/docsearch
Note: Each bar corresponds to the between-group share of total inequality for each partition, using a measure
of test-scores in the PISA 2000 mathematics examination. NB: Peru lacks school location data.22 International Poverty Centre
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If the problem is not
addressed, the high
growth rates may not be
maintained, affecting trade
and growth elsewhere.
Addressing it may involve
some short-term costs to
growth, although redressing
the bad inequalities would
actually be good for growth.
Aggregate economic growth is
rarely balanced across regions or sectors
of a developing economy, and neither
China nor India is an exception. The post-
reform pattern of growth has not been
particularly pro-poor in either country.
It has been uneven geographically,
sectorally and across households. Because
the more rapid growth of both countries
has been so uneven in these dimensions,
it has sometimes brought disappointing
outcomes in terms of progress against
income poverty and other dimensions
of well-being.
In China, growth in the primary sector
(primarily agriculture) did more to reduce
poverty and inequality than growth in
either the secondary or tertiary sectors.
In India, with higher initial inequality in
access to land than China, agricultural
growth was less important than tertiary
sector growth. In both countries, there has
been a marked geographic unevenness
in the growth process, with numerous
lagging regions, including some of those
that started off among the poorest.
Income inequality is rising, although
India has not yet experienced the same
trend increase in inequality that China
has seen. The Gini index of income
inequality for China rose from 28
percent in 1981 to 41 percent in 2003,
though not continuously, and more in
some periods and provinces. In the case
of India, one finds that the Gini index
rose in the 1990s, although the increase
was less pronounced than in China.
However, it is too early to say if India
is undergoing a trend increase in
inequality similar to what China has
experienced. As can be seen from the
figure, rising inequality in India is seen
to be a recent phenomenon. Indeed,
there is no statistically significant trend
increase in consumption inequality in
India up to the early 1990s.
Perceptions “on the ground” that
inequality is rising markedly in India
do not appear to sit easily with the
impression given by the figure. Popular
opinion can be mistaken, but nor are the
data perfect. The survey-based numbers
may well understate the relative gains to
the rich, and that is consistent with the
evidence from tax returns. The visible
changes in consumption patterns and
lifestyles that the rich have achieved may
well not be reflected properly in the
survey-based inequality measures. Also,
and possibly more importantly, the
perception of sharply rising inequality
in India may well reflect rising absolute
inequality, as reflected in the absolute
gaps between the rich and the poor, as
distinct from the proportionate gaps.
There is evidence that many people view
inequality in absolute terms rather than
relative terms
Poverty in both countries is not
becoming any more responsive to
aggregate economic growth and is
becoming more responsive to rising
inequality. India’s poor did not start the
reform period with the same advantages
as China’s poor, in terms of access to land
and education.
Persistent inequalities in human resource
development and access to essential
infrastructure within both countries, but
probably more so in India, are clearly
impeding the prospects for poor people
to share in the aggregate economic gains
spurred by reforms. The geographic
dimensions of their inequalities and the
associated disparities in fiscal resources
and governmental capabilities loom large
as policy concerns for both countries.
In the future, it will be harder for either
country to maintain its past rate of
progress against poverty without
addressing the problem of high and
by Shubham Chaudhuri and
Martin Ravallion, the World Bank Good and Bad
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rising inequality. However, it is not
particularly useful to talk about
“inequality” as a homogeneous entity in
this context. Policy needs to focus on the
specific dimensions of inequality that
create or preserve unequal opportunities
for participating in the gains from future
economic growth.
We make a crucial distinction between
good and bad inequalities—drivers and
dimensions of uneven growth that are
good or bad in terms of what they imply
for how the living standards of poor
people evolve over time. We argue that
the post-reform development paths of
both India and China have been
influenced by and have generated both
types of inequalities.
Good inequalities are those that reflect
and reinforce market-based incentives
that are needed to foster innovation,
entrepreneurship and growth. Scattered
evidence suggests that the rise in
inequality with the introduction of market
reforms in both India and China is at least
in part a reflection of newly-unleashed
market-based incentives at work, in
contrast with the earlier period of
artificially low levels of inequality brought
about by regulatory distortions and
interventions that suppressed incentives
for individual effort and innovation.
There are two key dimensions of bad
inequalities. The first relates to location
in the presence of externalities,
impediments to mobility and heavy
dependence of local states on local
resources. These features can generate
geographic poverty traps whereby living
in a well-endowed area entails that a
poor household can eventually escape
poverty, while an otherwise identical
household living in a poor area sees
stagnation or decline. This is one
possible reason why initially poorer
provinces have often seen lower
subsequent growth.
The second dimension of undoubted
importance relates to inequalities in
human resource development—often
linked to credit market failures on the
demand side but also reflecting
governmental failures in service delivery.
The rising returns to schooling and
increasing dispersion of wages represent
good inequalities because they reflect
freer labor markets with increased
incentives for work and skill-acquisition.
But naturally, those with relatively little
schooling and few assets, or little access
to credit are less able to respond to these
incentives and are less well positioned to
take advantage of the new opportunities
unleashed by market-oriented reforms.
And thus, inequalities in human capital
are ‘bad inequalities’ in that they have
retarded poverty reduction through
growth in both countries.
While both countries need to be
concerned about the bad inequalities, we
suspect that it is China where the near-
term risk that rising inequality will
jeopardize growth and poverty reduction
is greater. Arguably, the Chinese authorities
have been able to compensate for rising
inequality by achieving high growth rates;
by this view, it is the rising inequality that
fuels growth in China, through the
political economy of maintaining social
stability. However, the emerging bad
inequalities in China will make it harder to
promote the growth that will be needed
to compensate for those inequalities.
Maintaining sufficient growth will require
even greater efficacy of the policy levers
used to promote growth.
Whether or not the problem of rising
inequality is successfully addressed, there
are likely to be implications for the rest of
the world. If the problem is not addressed,
then there is a risk that the high growth
rates will not be maintained, with spillover
effects for trade and growth elsewhere.
If it is addressed, and depending on
exactly how this is done, there may be
some short-term costs to growth,
although redressing the bad inequalities
would actually be good for growth. There
may also be consequences for the pattern
of trade, such as through a change in the
sectoral composition of growth; for
example, in both countries there appears
to be potential for cash crop expansion,
which would attenuate one important
source of concern about rising inequality,
and it can be expected that a large share
of this expansion in domestic cash-crop
output would be exported.
The new initiatives underway in both
countries are probably steps in the
right direction, although continuous
evaluative research will be needed on
the efficacy of these approaches relative
to alternatives. There are important but
poorly resolved issues concerning the
appropriate balance between types
of interventions. But an even harder
challenge remains, namely to improve
governance—capacity, accountability
and responsiveness—notably (but not
only) at the local level. If this challenge is
left unmet, the ultimate efficacy of any of
these initiatives will be in doubt. 
Shubham Chaudhuri and Martin Ravallion:
“Partially Awakened Giants: Uneven Growth
in China and India” in Dancing with Giants:
China, India, and the Global Economy, edited
by L. Alan Winters and Shahid Yusuf, World
Bank, 2007. See also World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 4069, Nov. 2006.
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In recent decades China’s economy
has grown more rapidly and in a more
sustained fashion than that of any other
country. As a result, most people in China
have higher incomes, consume more and
better goods, and live in better housing
than ever before. Between 1988 and 2002,
household income per capita on average
nearly tripled in real terms. Also, life
expectancy has increased, and education
levels continue to rise.
With growth, however, has come
a significant widening of income
differences among households and
individuals. Income inequality has risen
from a relatively low level in the early
1980s to a level that is now considered
high by international standards.
Although increased inequality often goes
hand in hand with economic growth and
development, in China the speed with
which inequality has increased, and the
level to which it has risen, is striking.
Inequality is not necessarily a problem.
Most would agree that past policies in
China had excessively compressed
personal income differentials, so some
increase was expected. Inequality reflecting
differences in effort, experience, skills,
investments, and risk can be justifiable
from economic and social standpoints.
Concerns arise, however, when incomes
differ excessively in ways that reduce
efficiency or violate accepted views of
fairness and justice. In such situations
inequality can erode social cohesion,
generate social and political instability,
and hinder economic growth. Concerns
also arise if segments of the population
are left behind, with insufficient resources
to meet basic needs or entitlements.
For most of the reform period, China’s
economic policies have placed highest
priority on growth and tolerated
widening inequality. This approach was
encapsulated in Deng Xiaoping’s well-
known statement that some people should
be allowed to “get rich first.” China’s leaders
have nevertheless been mindful of equity;
the government has adopted a range of
programmes for rural and regional poverty
alleviation and for social insurance and
welfare, mainly in urban areas, aimed at
addressing particular distributional issues.
These measures reflect concerns about the
impact of income gaps on stability, as well
as efforts by the Communist leadership to
maintain political legitimacy.
Interest in China’s income distribution
extends beyond its borders. China is the
most populous country in the world, and
so changes in the level and distribution
of its income hold implications for global
inequality and poverty. When trying to
understand changes in inequality and
poverty on a global scale, then,
knowledge of trends in China is essential.
China is also of general interest because
its experience may provide evidence and
insights relevant for understanding the
relationship between inequality and
development. The conventional wisdom
suggests that rising inequality is a
common phenomenon in early stages
of development, but this relationship
has been critically examined by economic
researchers and is subject to ongoing
debate. The experiences of formerly
planned economies in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia suggest that transition
is also a major force at play. Some would
argue that trade liberalisation is also a
contributing factor.
The validity of concerns over inequality
in China, and the sorts of policies
appropriate to addressing those
concerns, depends on the level
and characteristics of that inequality.
Empirical knowledge about the level andPoverty In Focus   June 2007    25
characteristics of inequality in China has
improved greatly over time, but significant
gaps remain. A lot is known about
inequality among provinces and regions,
but at the household and individual
levels most studies examine inequality
within urban areas or within rural areas.
Studies on inequality nationwide are
relatively scarce. Research on key facets
of inequality, such as the distribution of
wealth or the level of poverty, is spotty.
Gaps also exist in knowledge about
particular groups, such as migrants,
women, minorities, and the elderly. Most
studies rely on data more than a decade
old. In a rapidly changing environment
like China’s, effective policy requires more
up-to-date information. Data remain an
underlying constraint, limiting the scope
and timeliness of available studies.
A major finding is that the level of
income inequality in China remained
relatively stable between 1995 and 2002.
The forces generating more inequality
have been offset by emerging equalising
processes including: rising off-farm wage
employment in rural areas, convergence
in household per capita income among
provinces in eastern China, and widely
shared macroeconomic growth. Yet,
disequalising forces continue. The large
urban-rural income gap increased and
became an even more dominant source
of overall inequality. Education has
emerged as an important factor
underlying inequality.
Poverty, reversing past trends, declined
between 1995 and 2002. This encouraging
trend in poverty was accompanied by
rising inequality in the distribution of
wealth. The level of wealth inequality,
however, was not overly high by
international standards.
Including rural-to-urban migrants in the
calculations changes measured levels of
inequality and poverty in China, but the
impact is relatively modest; inequality
declines and poverty increases. Although
their income falls between that of the
urban and rural groups, migrants have
the highest rate of poverty. Migrant
poverty is higher than that of registered
urban households. It is also higher than
rural poverty, mainly because the urban
poverty line is higher than the rural one.
China’s path of economic reform and
transition since the late 1970s has been
marked by a wide range of significant
reform measures, most aimed at
promoting growth and development.
A major theme of the reforms since the
late 1980s has been to expand the role
of markets. In the early reform period
markets were encouraged to emerge
alongside planning in what was known
as the “dual-track” system, and the reform
policies focused on markets for goods.
Planning continued to replace markets
for production factors—land, labour, and
capital. The 1990s saw the continued
dismantling of the system of
administrative planning and pricing and
the improved functioning of markets for
goods and services. By the mid-1990s
planned allocation had been eliminated
for almost all consumer goods. In
addition, at this time the government
began to take steps to develop markets
for production factors.
The urban labour market reforms have
given enterprises more freedom to lay
off and hire workers. This, together with
the loosening of restrictions on rural-to-
urban migration, has allowed labour
markets to function more fully. Barriers to
such migration were put in place during
the planning period and embodied in
the household registration system.
During the 1990s factor market
development was also furthered by
ownership reforms. Small and medium-
sized state-owned enterprises were
privatised, converted into shareholding
operations, or leased; for larger state-
owned enterprises the government
initiated a programme of governance
reform and corporatisation. Such
measures have made enterprises in both
rural and urban areas more market
oriented, with implications for their
employment and other behavior. The
expansion of shareholding and private
enterprise has provided an impetus for
the expansion of financial and capital
markets. The urban housing reforms are
another aspect of factor market reforms
in the 1990s. In a remarkably short time
they have created, from scratch, markets
for private real estate in urban areas.
In a market environment, earnings
depend on households’ endowments of
factors such as labour, entrepreneurial
ability, education or skills, experience,
and physical or financial assets, as
well as on the prices or returns of
these endowments and other factors.
The expansion of markets during the
1990s thus led to greater differentiation
of incomes on the basis of household
endowments and characteristics.
Also, with the expansion of markets
for financial instruments and real estate,
the importance of income from assets
increased, although not necessarily
equally among households.
The process of factor price equalisation,
however, is as yet incomplete. Despite
continued market reform in the 1990s
and early 2000s, and while markets for
most goods and many services are now
well established, factor markets remain
fragmented and incomplete. Thus, for
example, worker mobility among urban
residents in China is higher than before,
but still much lower than in market
economies. Unemployment and other
forms of non-employment have
emerged, reflecting frictions and lack of
market clearing in urban labour markets.
This has affected the urban income
distribution; poverty is no longer a solely
rural phenomenon.
Our findings warn against making simple
predictions from one period to the next.
We have found processes working
toward more inequality as well as those
working toward less. Public policy can
influence both types of processes and
alter the relative balance between them.
Noteworthy here are policies affecting
labour mobility, especially between rural
and urban areas, education, public
finance, and the provision of social
insurance and social welfare programmes.
In view of the rising importance of asset
ownership, steps to strengthen property
rights and factor markets will also be of
crucial importance.
Finally, policies promoting broad
macroeconomic growth remain important
so as to promote further progress toward
the stage of development where the
benefits of growth spread from leading
sectors to the broader population. 
B. Gustafsson, L. Shi, T. Sicular (Eds.):
Inequality and Public Policy in China.
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IN   TIME
Studying individual time
use can tell us much about
the distribution of well-
being among population
groups, which is useful for
public policy and poverty
reduction strategies.
Women work more than
men, but their labour is
mostly unpaid; thus they do
not achieve more economic
power as a result.
However, most inequality
in time use is located within,
not between gender groups.




The way people use their time has direct implications for their well-being. Time is
particularly important because it is a scarce resource and virtually all human activities
are time consuming; allocating time to one activity requires restricting time for other
activities. The study of the distribution of individual time allocations can tell us much
about the distribution of well-being in a population.
Take, for instance, overwork, which has a clear impact on a person’s life. Excessive work
prevents people from living a reasonable family and social life and can even affect
seriously the health of an individual when it does not allow for adequate rest. Work,
here, does not mean only paid work but also unpaid domestic work. It is easy to
imagine that excessive domestic work can negatively affect the schooling of children
or the labour market participation of women.
One can always argue that there is no such thing as reduction of well-being due to
excessive work or any other activities since time is allocated according to choices and
rational individuals will always choose what is best for them. Nevertheless, for the
moral judgments involved in the issue, what matters is not which choices are made
but the restrictions affecting these choices. In order to understand these restrictions
the distributional analysis is crucial.
The figure illustrates that time allocation is not only a matter of individual choice. It
shows a generalized Lorenz curv—that is, a Lorenz curve in which the values were
multiplied by the mean of the distribution—of time spent working, be it paid or unpaid
work, by urban adult women and men in Bolivia, using data for 2001. As the populations
are ordered according to the amount of total time spent at work, these curves should
be interpreted as the cumulative workload along the population of each gender.
The first thing this figure shows is that the curves for men and women are very distinct.
This means that there is a clear differentiation by gender in the patterns of allocation
of time to work. It becomes hard to sustain that free choice prevails here since in a free
allocation—free from social roles and other constraints—there would be no reason for
such a clear group differentiation.
Second and perhaps more relevant is that the curve of women always lies above that
of men. This dominance of the curves means that the workload of women is higher
than that of men, regardless of the point of the distribution we assess it. Such a
sustained difference gives no room to doubt: there is a clear gender division of labour
in the Bolivian society leading women to work more than men. Some aspects of this
division of labour have implications to other spheres of life. As shown in the bar chart
(page 27), in many societies, particularly in the developing world, men systematically
participate more in the labour market but less in unpaid domestic activities. This leads
us to the conclusion that women work more than men but the fruits of this work do
not necessarily translate in more economic power.
Using gender as an example of the relevance of studying inequalities in time allocation
was not a random choice. Over the last twenty years feminist economists have correctly
insisted on the need of incorporating time use information in the system of national
accounts. Several non-market activities such as those related to the reproduction of the
labour force—child care, the preparation of food, among others—are valuable for the
Time Use, Inequality
and Well-being
by Joana Costa, Marcelo Medeiros and Rafael Guerreiro Osório,
International Poverty Centre
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(Selected countries).
society but are not accounted as such. Knowing the time spent on them is a first step to
evaluate this hidden contribution of women to economy and society. National accounts
are based on market prices and there are obvious difficulties to give prices to non-market
labour but despite the obstacles the fact is that the incorporation of time use in the
accounts gives visibility to this important but often neglected part of the economy.
National accounts, however, focus on aggregates. Equally important is to fully
understand the distribution among individuals and social groups underlying these
aggregates. The concern with time brought about by the desire of giving women
recognition for their non-market contributions can incorporate the concern with the
reasons why some people work so much and others so little. As in the case of income
distribution analysis, there are several reasons to look at time allocation inequalities
and studying them can contribute to explaining inequalities in other spheres of life.
In fact, gender is not the single determinant of inequalities in time allocation. As
depicted by the arc of the generalized Lorenz curves in the figure (page 26), much of
the total inequality is located not between, but within gender groups. Indeed, in the
Bolivian example, a decomposition of the total workload inequality shows that only a
small fraction of it can be related to the differences between men and women. Most of
it is inequality among males and among females because both are very heterogeneous
groups in terms of factors such as family composition, class position, and so on. As an
example, richer women can buy domestic services on the market, and therefore are less
prone than poorer women to suffer from overwork due to a double-shift of market
and non-market activities.
Besides gender, time use analysis can also contribute to a deeper understanding of
poverty and other issues. For pragmatic reasons, a typical income poverty study equates
higher income with more well-being. This seems to be the best feasible approach with
limited data, but it should be noted that the gains in well-being from additional income
may vary depending on how this income is earned. Earning income has costs and time is
part of these costs. For the individuals more work means more welfare coming from the
commodities their wages can buy but, on the other hand, less welfare coming from other
sources, such as family activities. There is a trade-off between time deprivation and
income deprivation; in other words, between time poverty and income poverty.
A simulation exercise using Brazilian data for 2004 shows how important this trade off
can be. Using a simple decile-based threshold to define as poor those who belong to the
two bottom deciles of the per capita household income distribution, we depart from an
income poverty incidence (headcount ratio) of 20 percent of the entire population. This
value ignores the amount of time spent in paid and unpaid work—that is, total work.
However, reducing the amount of hours of unpaid work to limit total work to 60 hours
per week increases the incidence to 21 percent. Going the other way around, reducing
paid work hours to limit the total workload at 60 hours per week increases the incidence
ratio even more, to 25 percent. Such simulations are always imperfect and depend on
assumptions but, in rough terms, this means that about one fifth of the poorest people
in Brazil are escaping income deprivation by falling into time deprivation.
A better understanding of the dynamics of time allocation can be very useful for public
policies. It can be used to enhance strategies for reducing inequalities and achieving
the MDGs. For instance, publicly run or subsidised crèches and pre-schools may
contribute to releasing female labour force to the market, thus reducing poverty and
increasing economic autonomy of women; they may also reduce overwork among
both men and women. Similar benefits may be accomplished in poor countries, where
women and children spend huge amounts of time on fetching water and firewood,
by extending public water supply, rural electrification and fuel subsidies and/or
improved fuel-efficient stoves. 
Marcelo Medeiros, Rafael Guerreiro Osório, Joana Costa: Gender Inequalities in Allocating
Time to Paid and Unpaid Work: Evidence from Bolivia. IPC Working Paper No. 34. April 2007.
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